Two others are presently severely restricted. Citrus Red No. 2 is used only to color the skins of Florida oranges because there is evidence it is a weak carcinogen. The use of Red No. 4, which caused adrenal damage in dogs, is confined to maraschino cherries.

Most of the artificial colorings on the market are coal-tar derivatives. Originally made from compounds derived from coal tar, they are now made with synthetic chemicals identical to the original coal-tar compounds.

Besides Red No. 2, at least one other widely-used coal-tar dye has become controversial. Tartrazine, or FD&C Yellow No. 5, has been proven to cause allergic reactions in some people, especially those who are sensitive to aspirin. Because Tartrazine, whose production has almost doubled in the past 13 years, is sometimes used to disguise products (egg or butter bread look as if they contain more of those ingredients if the coloring is used), it is a special target of consumer groups.

Richard Ronk, head of the F.D.A.'s Department of Color Additives, said that the agency recognizes the studies that have been done on the allergic responses and the recommendations by some scientist that the dye be eliminated from medications that use it for coloring.

He said the F.D.A. has no foreseeable plans to restrict it, although it might consider requiring food and drug manufacturers to disclose the presence of the dye on the label.

Tartrazine is found in pickles, gelatin desserts, powdered drink mixes, breakfast cereals, margarine, salt butter, cakes, cake and pudding mixes, candies, noncola soft drinks, [illegible] custards and many other yellow-colored products.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, through inadvertence there was an omission in the text of a bill, S. 99, to establish a Joint Committee on National Security, which I introduced on January 15, 1975, and as printed in the RECORD—page S182. I ask unanimous consent that the permanent RECORD be corrected accordingly and that the full text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 99

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress declares that—

(1) it has been vested with responsibility under the Constitution to assist in the formulation of the foreign, domestic, and military policies of the United States.

(2) such policies are directly related to the security of the United States;

(3) the integration of such policies promotes our national security; and

(4) the National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as a means of integrating such policies and furthering the national security.

The Congress further declares that the integration of such policies and furthering the national security also require oversight and monitoring by the Congress of activities of the intelligence agencies of the United States.

SEC. 2. (a) In order to enable the Congress to more effectively carry out its constitutional responsibility in the formulation of foreign, domestic, and military policies of the United States and in order to provide the Congress with an improved means for formulating legislation and providing for the integration of such policies which will further promote the security of the United States, there is established a joint committee of the Congress which shall be known as the Joint Committee on National Security, hereafter referred to as the "joint committee." The joint committee shall be composed of twenty-six Members of Congress as follows:

(1) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(2) the President pro Tempore of the Senate;

(3) the majority and minority leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives;

(4) the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy;

(5) the chairmen and ranking minority members of the House Appropriations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee;

(6) three Members of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate, two of whom shall be members of the majority party and one of whom shall be a member of the minority party;

(7) three Members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker, two of whom shall be members of the majority party and one of whom shall be a member of the minority party.

(b) The joint committee shall select a chiarman and a vice chairman from among its members.

(c) Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original appointment.

SEC. 3. (a) The joint committee shall have the following functions:

(1) to make a continuing study of the foreign, domestic, and military policies of the United States with a view to determining whether and the extent to which such policies are being appropriately integrated in furtherance of the national security;

(2) to conduct in a timely fashion a thorough review and analysis of activities of the intelligence agencies of the United States in order to determine whether their charters, organization and operations are consistent with the national security needs of the Government;

(3) to make a continuing study of the recommendations and actions of the National Security Council relating to such policies and activities, with particular emphasis upon reviewing the goals, strategies, and alternatives of such foreign policy considered by the Council; and

(4) to make a continuing study of Government practices and recommendations with respect to the classification and declassification of documents, and to recommend certain procedures to be implemented for the classification and declassification of such material.

(b) The joint committee shall make reports from time to time (but not less than once each year) to the Senate and House of Representatives with respect to its studies. The reports shall contain such findings, statements, and recommendations as the joint committee considers appropriate.

SEC. 4. (a) The joint committee, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized, in its discretion (1) to make expenditures, (2) to employ personnel, (3) to adopt rules respecting its organization and procedures, (4) to hold hearings, (5) to sit and act at any time or place, (6) to subpena witnesses and documents, (7) with the prior consent of the agency concerned, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel, information, and facilities of any such agency, (8) to procure printing and binding, (9) to procure the temporary services (not in excess of one year) or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, and to provide assistance for the training of its professional staff, in the same manner and under the same conditions as a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services and provide such assistance under subsections (i) and (j), respectively, of section 202 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and (10) to take depositions and other testimony. No rule shall be adopted by the joint committee under clause (3) providing that a finding, statement, recommendation, or report may be made by other than a majority of the members of the joint committee then holding office.

(b) Subpenas may be issued over the signature of the chairman of the joint committee or by any member designated by him or the joint committee, and may be served by such person as may be designated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the joint committee or any member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses. The provisions of sections 102–104 of the Revised Statutes (2 U.S.C. 192–194) shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with a subpena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section.

(c) With the consent of any standing, select, or special committee of the Senate or House, or any subcommittee, the joint committee may utilize the services of any staff member of such House or Senate committee or subcommittee whenever the chairman of the joint committee determines that such services are necessary and appropriate.

(d) The expenses of the joint committee shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate from funds appropriated for the joint committe, upon vouchers signed by the chairman of the joint committee or by any member of the joint committee authorized by the chairman.

(e) Members of the joint committee, and its personnel, experts, and consultants, while traveling on official business for the joint committee within or outside the United States, may receive either the per diem allowance authorized to be paid to Members of the Congress or its employees, or their actual and necessary expenses if an itemized statement of such expenses is attached to the voucher.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

AMENDMENT OF RULE XXII OF THE STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 4, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 4) amending rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate with respect to the limitation of debate.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Debate on this resolution may continue until the close of business today or the hour of 6 p.m., whichever is earlier.

Who seeks recognition?

PROPOSED CHANGE IN RULE XXII

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I am pleased to sponsor, together with the distinguished Senator from Minnesota and numerous other Senators, a resolution

amending rule XXII, to provide that cloture may be invoked on an affirmative vote of three-fifths rather than two-thirds of Senators present and voting. With adoption of this resolution, I believe we can achieve a fundamental and needed reform in the Senate by bringing into closer balance two of its most cherished rights—the right to debate and the right to vote.

Limiting debate is a common practice in representative government. As early as 1604, the British Parliament instituted a procedure, through which motion could be made to end debate, known as the previous question. This procedure was borrowed and utilized by the Continental Congress.

From 1789, when the First Congress met to establish rules pursuant to article I, section 5 of the Constitution, until 1917, the Senate operated without any effective means to limit debate. In 1846, the Senate initiated use of the unanimous consent procedure to fix a date on which a measure would be put to final passage. In 1870, the Senate adopted the so-called Anthony Rule, limiting each Senator to one 5-minute speech during the course of a debate on a particular measure.

Because these procedures required unanimous consent before they could be implemented, they were largely ineffective in preventing a small group of Senators—or even one Senator—from extending debate on an unlimited basis. This inherent weakness was dramatically demonstrated in 1917, shortly after the United States entered World War I. At that time, an important shipping bill was defeated in the Senate by a filibuster. Shortly after this defeat, President Wilson called the Congress into special session and requested adoption of some procedure to limit debate. As a result, the Senate leadership proposed adoption of what is now rule XXII. The resolution was debated, and in an atmosphere of national emergency, approved by a vote of 76 to 3. Only one day of debate was utilized to consider a measure which has had a profound impact on the effectiveness of the Senate.

Mr. President, I have given this cursory history of debate limiting procedures to point out what I believe to be two relevant points. First, there is nothing new, unprecedented, or revolutionary in our attempts to balance the rights of each Senator to debate and to vote. Striking a proper balance is a problem which has vexed legislative bodies for nearly four centuries. Second, there is no magic in the two-thirds formula adopted by the Senate in 1917, as evidenced by the manner in which rule XXII was initially adopted.

Mr. President, nearly 80 years ago, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, made the following observation:

> If the courtesy of unlimited debate is granted, it must carry with it the reciprocal courtesy of permitting a vote after due discussion. If this is not the case, the system is impossible. Of the two rights, moreover, that of voting is the higher and more important. We ought to have both, and debate certainly in ample measure, but if we are forced to choose between them, the right of action must prevail over the right of discussion. To vote without debating is perilous, but to debate and never vote is imbecile.

It is clear, Mr. President, that the Senate has not followed this worthwhile advice. Since 1917, the Senate has sought to limit debate through implementation of rule XXII 99 times. In the 93d Congress alone, 30 attempts were made. Yet, cloture has been invoked only 20 times, barely once in every five attempts. Additionally, no one can determine with accuracy the number of informal attempts at cloture, which have been turned back in the face of an uncompromising minority. And no one can estimate the number of surrenders by Senators with legislation of substance which have occurred at the mere threat of filibuster.

There can be no question that the events of the last 58 years with regard to rule XXII indicate a serious imbalance between the rights of those who would delay and those who would decide. We who support Senate Resolution 4 believe that a proper balance can be struck.

We who support this resolution believe that further steps must be taken to assure the orderly transaction of the Nation's business.

And we who support this resolution share the concern of many Americans that Congress must get on with the problems of the Nation and not waste countless hours, days, weeks, and months hopelessly mired in parliamentary entanglements.

But how, Mr. President, can we correct this imbalance? Certainly, not by majority cloture. During my time of service in this body, I have found on numerous occasions that extended debate can prevent hasty or ill-conceived action which could wrought much mischief in our country. As a result of this experience, I cherish the right of full debate as much as anyone, and I will seek to preserve that right as long as I continue to serve here. I know the vast majority of the other cosponsors of this resolution feel the same way. Thus, to argue that the modification of rule XXII we seek will end full discussion of every issue that comes before us is to greatly misread both our intent and the thrust of our proposal.

A shift from 66 to 60 percent of the Senate necessary to invoke cloture will not eliminate the precious right of full debate. But it will make it somewhat easier to more efficiently conduct public business by striking a better balance between the right of debate and the right to vote at some time. If a three-fifths cloture rule had been in effect for the past 58 years, 44, not just 20, of those 99 cloture petitions would have been successful—a considerable improvement, but hardly any "gag" on free speech.

Mr. President, a substantial majority of the Senate should be allowed to work its will at some point. Not to allow it to do so is to admit that the constitutional guarantee of equal representation will not apply and that a relative handful of Senators, may exercise a legislative veto power never contemplated by our Founding Fathers or the words of the Constitution.

How substantial a majority should be established to invoke cloture? Here obviously is where honest men can disagree, as they did when the present rule XXII was first adopted. The two-thirds rule is the result of well-intentioned men constructing what they hoped would be an effective compromise between the extreme of majority cloture, on the one hand, and unlimited debate, on the other. It was an honest attempt to find that fair balance of which I spoke earlier. Yet, as the evidence of the past 58 years indicates, this worthwhile effort has failed by making the majority necessary for cloture so substantial that it is nearly impossible to obtain. What we are suggesting today is a further modification of their original effort based on the experience of the past six decades. We believe that three-fifths of the Senate present and voting constitutes an ample majority, one which should have the right to act. But we also believe that three-fifths is not a majority so substantial as to be impractical of attainmen, the equivalent, in fact, of having no debate limitation at all.

Mr. President, article I, section 5 of the Constitution gives a majority of the Senate convened the right to modify and adopt its rules of procedure, regardless of rules which may have applied in previous Congresses. In the past, those who disagreed with this interpretation have claimed that because two-thirds of the 100 Members of this body carry over from one Congress to the next, the Senate is a continuing body, bound by the rules of previous years. To make this claim, however, is to state that the Constitutional right of the Senate to make its own rules applied only to the First Congress. It is no doubt true that the framers of the Constitution hoped each succeeding Congress would be guided by the experience and collective wisdom of its predecessors, thereby concurring in rules and procedures which could continue to withstand the test of time.

It is difficult to imagine, however, that these men intended each house of a new Congress to be restricted in efforts to amend its rules and procedures by what a majority of its Members considered to be outmoded and unworkable procedures. Yet, based on debates in other years this is precisely what the opponents of Senate Resolution 4 would have us believe.

In a sense, it is true that rule XXII as presently constituted has met the test of time. But it is also evident that the rule is in need of repair. Close examination reveals that while the form created in 1917 still remains, the substance has turned out to be something quite different from that which many of its architects anticipated.

Mr. President, the issues we are debating are large and merit the extended consideration they will no doubt receive. They go right to the heart of Senate tradition and purpose. Cloaked in the guise of a complicated parliamentary device, the question of cloture relates directly to the ability of the Senate to function fairly, effectively, and, above all, in a representative manner. The proposal we espouse is a reasonable, carefully balanced compromise that offers some hope of preserving that which is best in Senate tradition while eliminating or at least ameliorating part of that which is worst.

Public confidence in the effectiveness

re S.99

and Melrose. The garden area was approved on the site of the old Melrose dump located in the park. With the help of his crew, McHugh applied loam, compost and fertilizer on the land, then laid out 20 plots, each 20'x30'.

Young and old citizens worked the plots, lugging water in buckets from barrels near the gardens. McHugh hopes to till and provide onsite water for some of the plots this year. There is a long waiting list for the gardens, but until the redevelopment of Pine Bank Park is complete, additional space will be limited. The city is seeking $3.5 million from the U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation to rehabilitate the park. An integral part of the "new" park will be an expanded public garden.

Boston, too, has a success story. In Boston's Back Bay Fens Gardens, a unique city site because of its good soil and proximity to water, public gardening has flourished since World War II. But the Fens provides gardening space for only 200 of Boston's 600,000 residents.

In the search for more land to garden, Boston has turned to its nearly 3000 vacant lots. Unfortunately only a handful, maybe six or so of these vacant lots are workable in their present state. Most of these sites are covered with rubble and the soil is impoverished. To make them workable, a great deal of preparation is needed—but this costs money. Unfortunately, to date, little money has been found to fund the tilling, the laying of 9-12 inches of topsoil, fertilizer and water connections necessary to make these unused lots arable.

Yet there is hope. Money to purchase loam may become available from the city's Departmnet of Public Facilities which has some funds to distribute under the Community Development Revenue Sharing Program. Fertilizer may be available in the form of horse manure. The State Department of Agriculture is looking into the possibility of using manure wastes from Suffolk Downs Race Track to fertilize vacant lots.

Meanwhile, the Boston Parks and Recreation Department is moving ahead with its community gardening program. Last year the Department loamed and tilled eleven gardening sites; 17 sites are on tap for this year. (Any resident may apply this spring to the nearest Little City Hall for a garden plot. Plots are free; water is supplied by the city.)

But government can do only so much. Community gardening will flourish only in areas where there is vigorous local leadership. Citizens themselves must organize neighborhood gardening projects to take advantage of the land and services offered by local and state agencies.

The climate conducive for returning to the land is present. The rush is on. Hopefully, the next few years will see the greening of Massachusetts.—MARY ELLEN RIGANO, Freelance writer specializing in land use affairs.

[From the Boston Globe, Apr. 25, 1975]

VACANT LOTS TURNED INTO VEGETABLE GARDEN PLOTS

(By Stephen Curwood)

For years, weeds, junk and neglect ruled four vacant lots in the Highland Park neighborhood of Roxbury, something that inner-city residents say happens all too often to their open spaces.

But this year those four lots, and many others throughout Boston, have a new look. Gone are the brambles, beer cans and broken bricks, thanks to a recent city cleanup.

In their stead has come the concern of more than 50 neighborhood residents who are eagerly awaiting the delivery of topsoil by the city so they can begin planting their gardens.

"Everyone seems excited," said Robert Perry, property manager of the Roxbury Action Program, the neighborhood group coordinating the gardening effort. "People really haven't had a chance to grow anything before, and with the way the price of everything has been going up so high it will be a relief to go out to your garden to pick some tomatoes, cabbage and collard greens."

The Highland Park neighborhood's drive to replace eyesores with food-producing plots was made possible by recent state and city efforts to promote gardening by the public on government-owned land that would otherwise remain unused.

Yesterday, state and city land officials were brought together with gardening and other environmental activists at an inner-city environment conference sponsored by the vice chairman of the Boston Conservation Commission, Augusta Bailey.

The meeting at the Robert Gould Shaw community building on Blue Hill avenue, Roxbury, was attended by 150 persons, who soon found out that a major difference between the state's and Boston's programs is money.

Boston is spending a moderate amount of money on public gardening, but the state says it cannot afford to. For example, the newly created division of Land Use at the state Department of Agriculture has no money, one unpaid staff person, Warren Colby, and a borrowed division chief, Warren Shepard, whose salary is paid by the pesticide control division.

"What we can do is cut red tape," said Colby. "We can get the permission from the agencies involved—mostly Mental Health and Correction—for people to garden in appropriate places."

So far Colby and Shepard's office has inventoried about 6500 acres of state land for such use. There will be two basic programs, one for free use by community gardening groups and the other for rental use by commercial farmers.

"Of course not much land is in the city," Colby said. "But there is the Southwest Corridor under the DPU, MDC lands and the large Boston State Hospital complex."

It was suggested that persons who wish to take part in the program contact local gardening groups and conservation organizations or their little city hall.

The state secretary of environmental affairs, Evelyn Murphy, was keynote speaker at the conference. "We have to build the community priorities into the use of state land from the top," she said.

"That's why I selected the Metropolitan District commissioners that I did. The top man is a technical and economic expert in the field and highly capable of administration. The various associate commissioners were selected for the community involvement they will bring."

Boston's program is not wealthy by any means, but it does provide vacant lot cleanups, topsoil, and free roto-tillering of plots on city-owned land, said Larry Vignett of the Roxbury Little City Hall.

In addition, the city is willing to forgo the revenue and possible taxes resulting from the auctioning off of vacant lands for which gardening permits have been issued, said Tom Duroucher of the Real Property Division.

"Some people are banding together on their blocks to buy these vacant lots," said a woman in the audience, "as they are frequently sold for $100 or $200."

Another person noted that one season's worth of garden produce was worth more than that.

FOREIGN POLICY COMMISSION ENDORSES JOINT COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, you know of my long-standing interest in the question of achieving effective congressional oversight on the activities of our intelligence community. As a matter of fact, my first bill to create a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters was introduced in the 83d Congress on July 23, 1953. A revised and improved version of that legislation has been introduced in the last two Congresses and would establish a Joint Committee on National Security. My current bill, H.R. 54, is pending before the Committee on Rules. Identical legislation, S. 99, has been introduced by Senator HUMPHREY.

Against the background of that long history of interest and effort one can perhaps better understand my deep personal satisfaction over the endorsement this proposal has recently received from the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. As a member of the Commission I know the thoroughness with which this and other suggestions were reviewed. I know, too, and deeply respect, the competence of Commission Chairman Robert D. Murphy, the distinguished members of the Commission, and its able and dedicated staff. Their collective expertise and competence makes this endorsement of the Joint Committee on National Security particularly satisfying.

In an effort to be of assistance to my colleagues in the Congress I am pleased to insert the Commission report section on "A New Joint Committee" in the RECORD at this point. In addition, I am pleased to insert a column on this same subject by Charles Bartlett from the July 4 Washington Star.

The materials follow:

A NEW JOINT COMMITTEE

However useful the recommendations above concerning committee jurisdictions may prove, and however powerfully they may be reinforced by the proposals made below concerning committee staffs and analytic support, those recommendations leave untouched at least two major problems. One is that since political, military and economic aspects of foreign policy have become interlocked—and since many foreign and domestic policy issues undoubtedly will become so—Congress should contain some forum in which those interrelations can be directly weighed. This is particularly true in time of crisis when specialized standing committees, pressed for action, might benefit from help in appreciating how particular aspects of policy decisions relate to those being considered by other committees.

The second is that the Congress is requiring increased consultation with senior foreign policy officials of the executive branch at the same time that an increasing number of specialized committees are necessarily concerning themselves with the foreign policy aspects of their responsibilities. The result is the potential for a burdensome and unsustainable demand on senior executive officials for multiple appearances before Congress—a problem particularly severe when fast-moving events require the full and direct attention of the same officials in the conduct of policy.

Neither speed nor policy coordination are Congress' particular strengths—nor can they be. The greatest strength of the legislative process is its unique ability to explore alternatives and to weigh and resolve widely disparate points of view. Its strength in deliberation however, does not relieve Congress of responsibility for reasonable efficiency and

coordinating capacity. Indeed, if Congress is to play the greater foreign policy role which this Commission endorses, those capacities will increasingly be demanded of it. And as the staff survey of Congressional views indicates, most Members, while regarding policy coordination primarily as the responsibility of the executive, also favor changes to improve Congress' own efficiency in the coordination process.

With these problems in mind, the Commission considered a number of proposals. It concluded that a single innovation may be materially helpful.

"In the Commission's view, a Joint Committee on National Security should be established. It should perform for the Congress the kinds of policy review and coordination now performed in the executive branch by the National Security Council, and provide a central point of linkage to the President and to the officials at that Council. In addition it should take responsibility for Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community."

We believe this Committee should serve as the initial recipient and reviewer of reports and information from the executive branch on matters of greatest urgency and sensitivity directly affecting the security of the nation. It should advise the party leaders and relevant standing committees of both Houses of Congress on appropriate legislative action in matters affecting the national security, and should assist in making available to them the full range of information and analysis needed to enable them to legislate in a prompt and comprehensive manner.

The existence and activities of such a Joint Committee should in no way substitute either for direct consultation between the President and Congressional party leaders, or for the regular legislative and investigative functions of the present standing committees in each House. Rather, it should supplement these—providing a more systematic and comprehensive exchange of information, analysis and opinion than has proved possible under the existing committee and leadership system.

For both operational and security reasons, the Joint Committee should be small—containing not more than 20 Members. It should include the leaders of the key foreign, military, and international economic policy committees from each House, and several Members-at-Large appointed by the party leaders to represent them and to enhance the Committee's representativeness of the Congress as a whole.

The Commission recommends that the Joint Committee be vested with the following specific jurisdictions and authorities:

Receipt, analysis and referral (along with any recommendations it may consider appropriate) of reports from the President under the War Powers Act.

"Receipt and review of analytic products of the intelligence community.

"Oversight (in conjunction with the executive branch) of the system of information classification discussed above.

"Establishment and maintenance of facilities and procedures for storage and handling of classified information and materials supplied to the Congress.

"Establishment of a code of conduct to govern the handling by Committee members of classified or sensitive information."

The successful experience of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy illustrates the usefulness of legislative authority in helping assure a Committee's effectiveness. The Commission does not recommend that the proposed Joint Committee be vested with broad authority to report proposed legislation to the House and Senate. In general, any legislative recommendations of the Joint Committee should be reported to relevant standing committees for their consideration. The Commission finds, however, two narrow and specific areas in which the Joint Committee might usefully have authority to report legislation directly to the floor of each House just as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is empowered to do.

We propose that the Joint Committee:

"Consider the creation of a statutory system of information classification, and (if intelligence oversight is assigned to it).

"Be granted authority for annual authorization of funds for the intelligence community."

The Commission believes strongly that more systematic arrangements for Congressional oversight of the intelligence community are needed on a permanent basis. It believes that such oversight should be conducted by a Joint Committee of the Congress, and preferably one capable of assessing intelligence products and activities in the context of our total foreign policy. The Commission therefore believes the proposed Joint Committee on National Security would be the appropriate body for that task.

"In the event that this Committee is not established, however, the Commission recommends that a Joint Committee on Intelligence be established to assume the task of Congressional oversight of the intelligence community."

The Commission well understands that establishing a Joint Committee on National Security, and making it function effectively, would be difficult. While the Congressional survey indicates majority support among Members for greater joint efforts in Congress, it also suggests many doubts and practical problems. The Commission has carefully considered these difficulties. It concludes, nevertheless, that the likely impact of the Joint Committee upon Congress' capacity to play a more meaningful foreign policy role fully justifies the efforts and concessions necessary to create it and to make it work.

[From the Washington Star, July 4, 1975]

NEW APPROACH NEEDED ON FOREIGN POLICY

(By Charles Bartlett)

The irony of Congress' demands for an enlarged role in foreign affairs is underlined by the Murphy Commission's experiences with that great Montana Democrat, Mike Mansfield.

The Senate majority leader was an enthusiast for the move to create a commission to study the conduct of foreign policy three years ago. This was Congress' initiative and Mansfield was named, along with 11 other able citizens, to the panel. The initial meetings were held in his office to facilitate his attendance.

But the tug of Senate duties gradually eroded Mansfield's participation in the commission's strenuous inquiry. Finding it impossible to attend any of the meetings since Congress met in January, he missed all the final deliberations. He was represented by an aide, Donald Henderson, who was usually unaware of where the senator stood on the issues which came before the commission.

The other members of the commission were somewhat surprised, therefore, to receive, after their report had gone to the printer, a stinging dissent from Mansfield. Assailing the report as "thin gruel in a thick bowl," the Senator was particularly critical of the commission's lack of stress on Congress' role in foreign policy. The whole thrust of the report will work, he complained, to enshrine the "preeminence" of the executive branch.

This is not accurate. The report's greatest emphasis is on the fact that the foreign policy of the future is going to involve considerably more public and congressional participation. The public will be involved because foreign economic issues will bear heavily on domestic life. These issues will concern all members of Congress, the report asserted.

But the problem is how to get Congress involved in a constructive way. Nelson Rockefeller was blunt in declaring that Congress' recent contributions have "disorganized, fragmented, and often immobilized American foreign policy." He pointed out that domestic and foreign lobbies often exert great influences on foreign policy issues and that the disunity in Congress does not inspire confidence abroad that this country will hold a steady course.

The competition to get into the foreign policy act is intense today. One veteran in dealings with Congress on these issues is Ambassador William Macomber, who writes in his new book, "The Angel's Game," that the State Department must deal now "with all the Congress, committee by committee, group by group, individual by individual." In Macomber's view, the only hope is to find ways to make Congress and the executive "complement each other more and frustrate each other less."

This is the attraction of the Murphy Commission's advocacy of a Joint Congressional Committee on National Security Affairs. This could become a body with the potential to meet the need for an inner core of well-informed legislators, a group with whom the Secretary of State could touch base quickly and often. It could become a repository of the detailed information Congress will need to make valid judgments in times when the issues are complex.

Mansfield, faithful to his notion of a Congress in which every member is his own leader, complains that the joint committee will heavily intrude upon existing arrangements and deal the younger members out of these critical deliberations.

But it may be that Mansfield's spotty participation in the workings of the Murphy Commission points up the real weakness of the joint committee proposal. The committee's Senate members will perhaps be too busy to give it the time it deserves.

WHERE IS RUTH GAGE-COLBY AND WHY ARE THEY SAYING THOSE TERRIBLE THINGS ABOUT HER?

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, on May 25 Ruth Gage-Colby, writing on the letterhead of the New York Metropolitan Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, addressed a letter to the 75 Members of the Senate who had urged the President to stand firm with Israel. The letter criticized Israel's request for $2.5 billion in aid and took issue with the Senators' support of Israel.

Subsequent to that letter I have attempted to gain some clarification from the Women's International League and the Women Strike for Peace, which Ms. Gage-Colby said she represented, on the organizations' respective policies toward Israel.

While my original letter was addressed to Ms. Ruth Gage-Colby, I did not receive a response from her. It would appear that all correspondence on this matter has been taken over by the national office of the Women's International League and its executive director, Dorothy R. Steffens. Ms. Gage-Colby reportedly could not respond because she was in Mexico City.